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THE WRONG CHOICE TO ADDRESS
SCHOOL CHOICE: ESPINOZA V.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE
BROOKE RECZKA∗
INTRODUCTION
For many school-choice advocates, Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue1 is the chance to extend the Supreme Court’s
decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer2 in
2017.3 In Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court held that a state’s
exclusion of a church from a public benefit program to resurface
playgrounds discriminated against religion in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.4 Many school-choice proponents hope to extend the
Trinity Lutheran holding from playgrounds materials to school funding
and thus strike down religion-based exclusions in school voucher
programs.5 However, Espinoza is the wrong vehicle to do so. In
Espinoza, the Montana Supreme Court struck down a voucher-type tax
credit program that provided scholarships, which could be used at any
private school, as violating the Montana Constitution’s prohibition on

Copyright © 2020 Brooke Reczka.
∗ J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2021.
1. 435 P.3d 603, 608–09 (Mont. 2018).
2. 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
3. Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue: The Battle
Between May and Must Fund, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.scotus
blog.com/2019/09/symposium-espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue-the-battle-betweenmay-fund-and-must-fund/ [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza]. For the purposes of this
commentary, school-choice advocates believe that public education funds should follow students
to the educational institutional of their choice, whether it be public or private.
4. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017, 2024.
5. Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm Before the Storm for Religious-Liberty Cases?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019, 10:42 AM) https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/symposiumthe-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/ (“Applying Trinity Lutheran to funding for
private education opens the door to forcing states to include religious schools in any program
open to secular ones, including voucher programs.”).
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funding religious schools.6 By striking down the program, the state
court eliminated any alleged discrimination. Therefore, the Supreme
Court should affirm and decline to extend the non-discrimination
principles expressed in Trinity Lutheran to the use of funding for
religious education. If the Court ignores the lack of discrimination, as
it seems it might,7 it should in the alternative still affirm the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision as consistent with the Trinity Lutheran line
of cases and solidify the distinction between discrimination based on
religious status and religious use.
I. FACTS
In 2015, the Montana Legislature enacted a scholarship program
that gave dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $150 annually for
donations to nonprofit “student scholarship organizations.”8 Under
this scholarship Tax Credit Program, the scholarship organization used
these funds to provide tuition scholarships to a “Qualified Education
Provider” (“QEP”), defined under the statute to include essentially any
private school in Montana, including religious schools.9 Taxpayers
cannot direct their funds to go to a specific QEP, and the funds are paid
directly to the QEP by the student scholarship organization.10 Since the
program was enacted, only one student scholarship organization was
formed. Thirteen private schools received funding through that
organization, twelve of which were religiously affiliated.11
The Montana Department of Revenue is the agency “responsible
for implementing and administering” the Tax Credit Program and was
granted authority to adopt rules necessary to do so.12 The Legislature
also dictated that the Department of Revenue must comply with
Article X, Section 613 of the Montana Constitution—commonly known

6. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 614.
7. SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3.
8. Brief of Respondents at 3, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (mem.)
(No. 18-1195) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents].
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102(7) (2015). The relevant part reads:
“Qualified education provider” means an education provider that: (a) is not a public
school; (b)(i) is accredited . . . (c) is not a home school . . . (d) administers a nationally
recognized standardized assessment test or criterion-referenced test . . . (e) satisfies the
health and safety requirements prescribed by law for private schools in this state; and
(f) qualifies for an exemption from compulsory enrollment . . . .
10. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 606.
11. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 5.
12. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607.
13. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6.
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as the “No-Aid Clause”—in administering the program.14 The No-Aid
Clause was adopted in 1972 when Montana held a Constitutional
Convention to create a new state constitution.15 The provision prohibits
the government from making “any direct or indirect appropriation or
payment from any public fund or monies . . . for any sectarian purpose
or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university . . .
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination,”
with an exception for federal funds intended for private schools that
can be channeled through the state government.16 Thirty-seven other
states have similar constitutional provisions restricting aid to religious
schools in varying degrees.17 Soon after the Tax Credit Program was
enacted, the Department of Revenue implemented Rule 1, which
provided that religious schools did not qualify as QEPs under the
program.18 The Department of Revenue justified Rule 1 as being
necessary to bring the Tax Credit Program into compliance with the
No-Aid Clause as the scholarship program statute required.19
Petitioners, parents of children granted scholarships through the
Tax Credit Program, sued the Department of Revenue and its Director
to challenge Rule 1 on free exercise grounds.20 A Montana district court
found for the Petitioners and granted an injunction against Rule 1,
holding the No-Aid Clause was inapplicable because the tax credits
were not “appropriation[s]” under the No-Aid Clause.21 The
Department of Revenue appealed.22 The Tax Credit Program remained
intact without any limitation on funds going to religious schools as the
case was being litigated up to the highest court in the state.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment,24 incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
14. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607.
15. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 18.
16. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6.
17. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 2. Cf. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 610–11 (observing
that Montana’s no-aid provision is distinct from those of other states because it contains a stronger
prohibition against any kind of aid to religious schools).
18. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 4–5.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
21. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 608.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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Amendment,25 bar the federal and state governments from establishing
a religion and interfering with the free exercise of religion.26 The
Establishment Clause constructs “a wall of separation between church
and state,” barring laws that aid religion or exhibit a preference for one
religion over others.27 The Free Exercise Clause forbids laws that
prohibit the free exercise of religion or discriminate against religion,
including broad bans, indirect coercion, and penalties on religious
exercise and exclusions from generally available public benefits.28
The dual commands of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment embody two longstanding traditions— a commitment to
“staunch protection of religious freedom” and a “principled opposition
to government aid to religious institutions”29—whose interests are
“frequently in tension.”30 Still, between the fundamental prohibitions
of the Religion Clauses, there is “room for play in the joints” where
“there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause
but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”31
For example, in Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld a
Washington state scholarship program that prohibited recipients from
using funds to receive a devotional theology degree against a free
exercise challenge.32 The Court found the exclusion for devotional
theology degrees was justified by the state’s longstanding antiestablishment interest in not funding the training of religious clergy.33
The Court stated that there was “no doubt that the State could,
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (“Prior to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a restraint
against the states.”).
26. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (“The general principle
deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion.”).
27. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16, holding:
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion.
28. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
31. Id. at 719.
32. Id. at 724.
33. Id. at 723–24.
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consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit [scholarship
recipients] to pursue a degree in devotional theology.”34 However, even
though the Establishment Clause would have permitted the state to
administer the program without an exception for theology degrees, the
Free Exercise Clause did not compel the state to do so.35 Washington
could draw “a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States
Constitution” and prohibit funding the training of the clergy without
stepping outside of the “room for play in the joints.”36
The Supreme Court has held that a law violates the Free Exercise
Clause when it creates a “prohibition” on religious exercise through an
outright ban, indirect coercion, or penalties on free exercise.37 For
example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,38 the Colorado Civil Rights Commission fined cake shop
owners for refusing to provide a cake for a same-sex couple in violation
of the state’s antidiscrimination laws.39 The Supreme Court found for
the cake shop owners, holding the financial penalty constituted a
prohibition on their free exercise of their religion, thus violating the
Free Exercise Clause.40 However, laws that simply “make it more
difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to
coerce individual into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not
constitute an unconstitutional prohibition on religious exercise.41
Beginning with its decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah42 in 1993, the Supreme Court has increasingly
acknowledged “that nondiscrimination is crucial to religious freedom”
and has struck down laws that discriminate against religion.43 In this
line of cases, the Court applies strict scrutiny to laws that restrict free

34. Id. at 719.
35. Id.; see Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017)
(“[W]e have recognized that there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the Establishment Clause
permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.” (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 718)); see also
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 608–09 (Mont. 2018) (stating that when a state
creates greater separation of church and state, it narrows the “room for play” between the
Religion Clauses).
36. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718, 722.
37. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022).
38. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
39. Id. at 1725–26.
40. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11.
41. Id. at 12 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 450
(1988)).
42. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
43. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 1; SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3.
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exercise when laws are not neutral in their treatment of religion.44
Hialeah involved city ordinances criminalizing specific forms of animal
slaughter that were integral to the Santeria religion and loathed by
other residents of the city.45 The ordinances were challenged under the
Free Exercise Clause as having a discriminatory purpose despite being
facially neutral.46 The Court struck down the ordinances, finding that
laws “that target[] religious conduct for distinctive treatment or
advance[] legitimate government interests only against conduct with a
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”47
Most recently, in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court reiterated
these principles and expanded the non-discrimination concept to
public benefits that were denied to religious entities because of their
religious status.48 In that case, the Trinity Lutheran Church was denied
a government funding grant to resurface its playground when it was
otherwise qualified to receive it solely because it was a religious
institution.49 Thus, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the
state’s interest in maintaining a greater separation of church and state
was not compelling.50 In a footnote, a plurality of justices explicitly
clarified that the majority’s holding only applied to playground
resurfacing and did not address “religious uses of funding.”51
III. HOLDING
The Montana Supreme Court struck down the Tax Credit Program
as indirectly aiding religious schools in violation of the No-Aid Clause
of Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution.52 To interpret the
No-Aid Clause, the Montana Supreme Court looked to the Delegates’
intent discerned from the text’s plain meaning and “in light of the
historical and surrounding circumstances under which the [Delegates]
drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced,

44. SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3.
45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526–27 (1993).
46. Id. at 528–29.
47. Id. at 546.
48. See SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3 (“In Trinity Lutheran the court expanded
the nondiscrimination concept from Lukumi Babalu Aye to situations in which a public benefit
without religious content – in that case, rubber chips for resurfacing playgrounds – is denied to an
entity specifically because the entity is religious.”).
49. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
50. Id. at 2024.
51. Id. at 2024 n.3.
52. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018).
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and the objective they sought to achieve.”53 The court determined that
the 1972 Delegates intended to “broadly and strictly prohibit[] aid to
sectarian schools.”54 The transcripts from the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention illustrate the Delegates’ concerns that it
would weaken the public school system if funds could be diverted away
to religious and other private schools.55 The transcripts show that the
Delegates intended to craft a provision for their state constitution that
more strictly prohibited aid to religious schools than its federal
counterpart.56
Determining that the Legislature provided tuition indirectly to aid
religious schools, the court found that the Tax Credit Program was
facially unconstitutional and violated the No-Aid Clause’s
“constitutional guarantee to all Montanans that their government will
not use state funds to aid religious schools.”57After striking down the
Tax Credit Program as unconstitutional, the court continued to address
the constitutionality of Rule 1 even though “[a]s a result, [it was]
superfluous.”58 The court found that Rule 1 exceeded the Department
of Revenue’s rulemaking grant under the statute.59 Under the statute
that enacted the Tax Credit Program, the Department of Revenue
could only issue rules consistent with the statute.60 The statute
contained a broad definition of QEP clearly meant to encompass
religious schools.61 Therefore, limiting the definition of QEP under
Rule 1 to exclude religious schools was inconsistent with the statute
and exceeded the Department of Revenue’s rulemaking powers.62 The
Department of Revenue could not “transform an unconstitutional
statute into a constitutional statute with an administrative rule.”63
IV. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Petitioners—parents of children who received tuition scholarships
through the Tax Credit Program to attend a nondenominational
53. Id. at 609.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 610.
56. See id. (discerning the delegates’ intent from their understanding that the state clause
prohibited forms of aid that were permissible at the federal level).
57. Id. at 612–14.
58. Id. at 614.
59. Id. at 615.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Christian school—argue that the Montana Supreme Court’s
application of the No-Aid Clause to exclude religious options in the
Tax Credit Program is “inherently discriminatory” and violates the
Free Exercise Clause principles restated in Trinity Lutheran.64 The
Petitioners argue the state court’s interpretation of the No-Aid Clause
to prohibit religious options in a neutral student-aid program
discriminates against the “religious beliefs and religiously motivated
conduct” of the Petitioners.65 The court’s interpretation also
discriminates against the religious “status” of the families and the
schools: families were motivated by their “status” to send their children
to religious schools, and the schools are barred by their “status” from
participating in the Tax Credit Program.66 Therefore, because the
application of the No-Aid Clause in this case discriminates against free
exercise rights protected by the First Amendment, the Court should
apply strict scrutiny.67 Petitioners argue the Montana Supreme Court’s
application of the No-Aid Clause cannot survive strict scrutiny because
its only justification for discriminating against religious beliefs and
status—to “achiev[e] greater separation of church and state than is
already ensured under the Establishment Clause”—is insufficient and
has been rejected by the Court in Trinity Lutheran and Widmar v.
Vincent68 as not “compelling.”69 The Petitioners do not ask the Court to
invalidate the No-Aid Clause, only its application here.70
Petitioners urge the Court to expand its holding in Trinity Lutheran
beyond the situation of playground resurfacing materials denied
because of religious status, and find that the application of the No-Aid
Clause to strike down the Tax Credit Program also “discriminates
64. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (mem.)
(No. 18-1195) (Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. This commentary will focus only
on the two parties’ arguments relating to the Free Exercise Clause, as the case is considered to be
primarily concern free exercise issues. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The New Court and
Religion, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/
symposium-the-new-court-and-religion/ (stating that Espinoza will give an indication of how the
newly composed Supreme Court will approach free exercise questions).
65. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17.
66. See id. at 18–19 (adding that many religious families, namely Catholics, are required by
Vatican II to send their children to religious schools whenever possible).
67. Id. at 20.
68. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
69. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 20–21 (stating states have attempted to rely
on Blaine Amendments to justify religious exclusions but the Supreme Court rejected this
argument).
70. Id. at 14 (“And while invalidating section 6(1) is not required here, this Court should
not allow this provision to strike down the scholarship program just because it allows religious
options.”).
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against the religious use of student-aid money” in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.71 Petitioners would not bind the Court to the
stipulation in the footnote in Trinity Lutheran that the holding in
Trinity Lutheran does not address “religious uses of funds.”72 Instead,
the Petitioners rely on the concurrence of Justices Gorsuch and
Thomas, stating “discrimination based on religious ‘use’ is just as
constitutionally offensive” under the Free Exercise Clause “as
discrimination based on religious ‘status.’”73 Petitioners argue that
there is not a meaningful distinction between religious status and
religious use because many devout families send their children to
religious schools because it is mandated by their religion.74 Therefore,
denying a benefit based on proposed religious use in effect denies the
benefit based on religious status.75
Petitioners also devote specific attention to distinguishing Espinoza
from Locke, arguing that Locke actually condemns prohibiting all
religious options in student-aid programs.76 In Locke, the Court upheld
the devotional theology exclusion in a generally available scholarship
program.77 Petitioners argue the Court’s holding in Locke was narrow,
and the result was dependent on the program’s inclusivity and lack of
hostility towards religion.78 In addition, Petitioners stress that the
exclusion was justified by the state’s substantial and longstanding
“interest in not funding the training of clergy,” in contrast with the
“deeply troubling” purpose of the No-Aid Clause’s prohibition on all
aid.79 Petitioners contend that the No-Aid Clause is a Blaine
Amendment, adopted in order to discriminate against Catholics.80
Blaine Amendments are state constitutional provisions enacted in the
mid-to-late 1800s to prevent funding for Catholic schools at a time
71. Id. at 21.
72. See id. at 22 (“[D]enying that aid because of the religious use to which such families
would put it is to deny that aid because of their religious status.”); Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.3 (2017).
73. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 21–22 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added)).
74. Id. at 22.
75. See id. (“[D]enying [student] aid because of the religious use to which such families
would put it is to deny that aid because of their religious status.”).
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 23–24.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 26–27 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 n.5 (2004)).
80. Id. at 27 (noting that the holding in Locke depended on saying there was no animus
underlying the state’s exclusion); see generally id. at 31–45 (presenting the history of no-aid clauses
in Montana to argue that the No-Aid Clause is a Blaine Amendment and its application violates
the Equal Protection Clause).
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when the public schools often had strong Protestant influences and
elements.81 At a height of anti-Catholic animus, Representative James
Blaine led a campaign to amend the Constitution to prohibit school
funding for any religious sect that ultimately failed.82 However, Blaine
turned his attention to the states, and successfully helped pass similar
‘Blaine Amendments’ into numerous state constitutions.83 Petitioners
argue these Blaine Amendments, rooted in anti-Catholic animus and
hostility towards religion, “exacerbate[] the Free Exercise” issues
because the government “may not devise mechanisms, overt or
disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion.”84
V. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Respondents, the Montana Department of Revenue and the
Director of the Department of Revenue, urge the Court to reject
Petitioners’ claim that No-Aid Clause application violates the Free
Exercise Clause and uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to
strike down the Tax Credit Program.85 To prove that the application of
the No-Aid Clause violated the Free Exercise Clause, Respondents
argue that Petitioners must show they were prohibited, coerced, or
penalized from practicing their religion, or that they were denied a
generally available benefit because of their religious status.86
Respondents argue Petitioners cannot show a prohibition on their
religious free exercise because the state court struck down the Tax
Credit Program for religious and non-religious beneficiaries alike; thus,
the Petitioners are neither treated differently nor being denied a
benefit because the benefit does not exist.87 Respondents distinguish
this case from Trinity Lutheran because there is no benefit being denied
after the Tax Credit Program was struck down; while in Trinity
Lutheran, the church was being denied playground-resurfacing
materials because of its religious status.88 Similarly, without a benefit to
be denied, there can be no coercion to abandon one’s faith in order to
receive a benefit.89 By striking down the Tax Credit Program as
81. Id. at 31–32.
82. Id. at 34–35.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 27 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547 (1993)).
85. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 10.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 12–13.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id.
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violating the No-Aid Clause, the Montana Supreme Court ensured that
religious families would not be discriminated against or punished for
exercising their religious freedom.90
Respondents also contest Petitioners’ description of the No-Aid
Clause as a Blaine Amendment motivated by religious animus.91
Respondents stress that the “operative document” is not the 1889 noaid provision that Petitioners spend considerable time discussing92 but
the No-Aid Clause debated and enacted by the Delegates of Montana’s
Constitutional Convention of 1972.93 Respondents argue these 1972
Delegates were not motivated by religious bigotry, but instead believed
the No-Aid Clause would protect religious freedom.94 The Delegates
believed allowing government aid to religious schools would weaken
both the public school system and religious institutions, as well as
infringe on the religious freedom of other taxpayers.95 Respondents
also emphasize that the Montana Supreme Court was not motivated by
hostility towards religion when it applied the No-Aid Clause in this
case, but was instead motivated by a desire to ensure religious schools
would not be penalized based on their religious status.96
Respondents also argue that the Court’s decision in Locke, both in
its majority and dissenting opinions, supports the Montana Supreme
Court’s application of the No-Aid Clause to strike down the Tax Credit
Program.97 Respondents stress that Locke supports a state’s decision to
“singl[e] out religious education as the one thing [it] would not fund,”
including through a constitutional provision.98 Further, the provision
that was the basis for the exclusion in Locke was aimed at prohibiting
funding degrees “designed to induce religious faith.”99 Respondents
argue that drawing a line between higher education and primary and
secondary education would be arbitrary, as the latter two are also

90. Id. at 13.
91. Id. at 41–42.
92. Id. at 18; see generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 28–45 (discussing the 1889
Montana constitutional amendment).
93. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 18.
94. Id. at 17–18.
95. Id. at 19–21.
96. Id. at 23; see also id. at 23–24 (discussing the argument of Justice Gustafson in her
concurrence that the court’s decision also protects religious freedom by not “conditioning a
government benefit on a person’s willingness to violate his religious beliefs by donating money to
support schools of a different religion”).
97. Id. at 33–35.
98. Id. at 34.
99. Id. (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 716 (2004)).
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inherently designed to “induce religious faith.”100 Respondents
highlight that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Locke prescribed the exact path
taken by the Montana Supreme Court in ensuring that religious
individuals and institutions are not being denied a generally available
public benefit.101 When faced with dual concerns over the “conscience
of its taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause . . . the State could
also simply abandon the program altogether.”102 Cutting further against
Petitioners’ argument, Respondents stress Scalia’s statement that
striking down the entire program would be permissible even if it were
to prevent the funding of religion.103
Respondents present three other arguments supporting the
constitutionality of the No-Aid Clause itself and its application to the
Tax Credit Program.104 First, Respondents argue that the issue of
taxpayer support for religious institutions was left to the people in the
First Amendment, and highlight that James Madison, the architect of
the Free Exercise Clause, had a “principled opposition to state funding
of religious institutions.”105 Second, Respondents urge the Court to
defer to the strong national tradition of state constitutional provisions
that prohibit funding religious schools.106 Finally, Respondents argue
that accepting Petitioners’ position would be inconsistent with the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has sustained the
states’ ability “to decide whether to enact school-choice programs that
support religious schools.”107 Respondents contend this discretion
should also include the ability to decide not to enact such programs
through a prohibition at the constitutional level.108
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s
application of the No-Aid Clause to invalidate the Tax Credit Program.

100. Id.
101. See id. at 35 (stating the dissent took the stance in Locke that a benefit was being denied).
102. Id. at 36 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 8–9, 12 (noting that Petitioner’s argument is framed as a challenge to the NoAid Clause itself regardless of the fact that schools are not being excluded from a benefit program
because no program exists that they could be excluded from).
105. Id. at 28–29.
106. See id. at 40–44 (“There is an unquestionably longstanding tradition of no-aid clauses . . .
. [T]he tradition, should, in and of itself, support the constitutionality of no-aid clauses . . . . This
Court regularly applies this methodology in Establishment Clause cases.”).
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. at 46–47.
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The outcome of this case, as exhibited by both of the parties’ briefs,
hinges heavily on the Court’s interpretation of two cases: Trinity
Lutheran and Locke.109 Both cases involved religion-based exclusions
from a public benefit program.110 However, the Court should conclude
its analysis quickly and focus on the key feature distinguishing
Espinoza from Locke and Trinity Lutheran: there is no public benefit
from which Petitioners can be excluded.111 Petitioners’ free exercise
challenge must fail because they cannot show any “prohibition” of their
religious free exercise or any discrimination based on their religious
beliefs, conduct, or status.112 Petitioners are in the exact same position
as if the Tax Credit Program had never been enacted or had come to its
natural end.113 Most importantly, by striking down the Tax Credit
Program, Petitioners are in the exact same position as all other
Montanans.114
The same “play in the joints” theory applies to Montana’s No-Aid
Clause as was the case when the Locke Court held that states are able
to take action that the Establishment Clause permits but the Free
Exercise Clause does not require.115 Petitioners are careful throughout
their brief to argue only the discriminatory application of the No-Aid
Clause was unconstitutional, not the No-Aid Clause itself.116
Potentially, Petitioners stop short of making this claim in recognition of
the strong national tradition of state constitutional provisions that
exclude religious institutions from receiving school funding.117
However, Petitioners’ argument would in effect invalidate the No-Aid
Clause, stripping it of its ability to achieve its primary purpose. This
interpretation is inconsistent with the Court’s position that not only
109. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64 (dedicating considerable individual
attention to both Trinity Lutheran and Locke); Brief of Respondents, supra note 8 (same).
110. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017) (finding
the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran Church from a public benefit to be a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (rejecting free exercise challenge to
the exclusion of devotional degrees from a generally available scholarship program).
111. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 6, at 16 (stating the Court’s holding in Trinity
Lutheran presupposes a benefit program exists and is excluding religious institutions).
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 608 (Mont. 2018) (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
116. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 14 (“And while invalidating section 6(1) is not
required here, this Court should not allow this provision to strike down the scholarship program
just because it allows religious options.”).
117. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 40–41 (“Petitioners do not dispute the
longstanding and widespread nature of no-aid clauses.”).

RECZKA FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

250

4/28/2020 9:31 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

does “room for play in the joints” exist, but also that funding
restrictions for religious education is a form of approved play.118
If the Court declines to resolve the case by focusing on the lack of
discrimination, the Court should, in the alternative, affirm the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision below as consistent with Locke and Trinity
Lutheran. In Trinity Lutheran, the Court distinguished its facts from
those in Locke.119 The Court stated that in Trinity Lutheran the church
was denied a public benefit of playground resurfacing materials
because of its status as a religious institution.120 In contrast, the student
in Locke was not denied scholarship funds because of his status as a
religious individual, but instead because of what he was going to use
those funds for: train for the ministry.121 Trinity Lutheran and Locke
both involve a religion-based exclusion from a public benefit program,
but the different outcomes the Court reaches are internally consistent
when viewed in light of the status/use paradigm. Some current Supreme
Court Justices, and surely the Petitioners, do not view this distinction as
meaningful.122 However, the status/use distinction helps evaluate the
free exercise issues at play by stressing the implications of the choices
created by exclusions based on religious status versus religious use. In
situations like Trinity Lutheran, the choice for the church is to forgo the
benefit or deny its status as a church.123 This is a prohibition on the
church’s free exercise rights; the church is coerced to not exercise its
religious freedom if it wants to receive the benefit.124 In contrast, in
situations like Locke, even if the student said that he was not religious
but wanted to use the scholarship funds to study devotional theology
anyway, he would still be denied the benefit.125 The student in Locke is
not presented with the same coercive choice of being denied a benefit
unless he abandons his religious beliefs.

118. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718, 725 (2004) (“If any room exists between the two
Religion Clauses,” it is that States have a substantial interest “in not funding the pursuit of
devotional degrees . . . .”).
119. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–24 (2017).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17 (arguing prohibiting the use of public funds
at religious schools is discrimination based on religious status); Mark Rienzi, supra note 5
(“Kavanaugh [joined by Alito and Gorsuch] wrote the exclusion of religious organizations from
equal participation in a government program ‘simply because they are religious’ is ‘pure
discrimination against religion.’”).
123. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
124. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17.
125. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004) (noting that religion is irrelevant as
“the State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction,” for all people).
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Here, Petitioners were not denied a benefit because of their
religious status. Instead, like the student in Locke, they were denied the
benefit because of their proposed use for the scholarship funds:
religious education. Laws that “make it more difficult to practice
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into
acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not run afoul of the Free
Exercise Clause.126 Even though Petitioners’ religious beliefs helped
motivate their choice to send their children to religious schools, they
are not forced to act contrary to those beliefs.127 Like Washington in
Locke, Montana had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction”128 As the Court stated in Locke, “religious instruction is of
a different ilk,” and there is a long history of states treating the funding
of religious education differently that dates back to the founding.129 The
Trinity Lutheran Court’s discussion of Locke, as well as its stipulation
in a footnote about the holding not reaching the situation of religious
funding, support this understanding.130 The Court should heed the
footnote in Trinity Lutheran and decline to extend its nondiscrimination concept in free exercise cases to situations of the
religious use of funding like Espinoza.
Nevertheless, if the newly composed Supreme Court is seeking to
extend its non-discrimination free exercise principles into the context
of student-aid funding,131 Espinoza is the wrong vehicle to do so for two
reasons. First, as has already been discussed, Petitioners are not being
discriminated against or treated any differently than any other
Montana resident; no benefit program exists from which they are being
excluded.132 Second, contrary to Petitioners’ straw man argument about
the “deeply troubling” motives underlying the Court’s application of
the No-Aid Clause, the No-Aid Clause is not a Blaine Amendment

126. Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 12 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)).
127. Id.
128. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721.
129. Id. at 721–23.
130. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 2024 n.3
(2017) (“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identify with respect to
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of
discrimination.”).
131. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The New Court and Religion, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul.
26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/symposium-the-new-court-andreligion/ (anticipating major changes in free exercise clause jurisprudence in the coming years in
the direction of robust protection for religion).
132. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 16.
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rooted in religious animus.133 The operative No-Aid Clause was passed
in 1972, with an awareness of the previous constitution’s problematic
history, and was motivated instead by a desire to protect religious
freedom.134 Espinoza does not present the opportunity to address the
constitutionality of Blaine Amendments, and any discussion of the NoAid Clause in those terms is misplaced.135
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s
application of its No-Aid Clause to strike down the Tax Credit
Program. While the newly composed Court may be seeking an
opportunity to expand its free exercise non-discrimination principles
into the school-funding context,136 the Court should refrain from doing
so not only because Espinoza would be the wrong vehicle for such an
argument, but also because this expansion is inconsistent with the
Court’s decisions in Locke and Trinity Lutheran.137 The Court should
focus on the lack of discrimination present in this case and affirm the
decision of the Montana Supreme Court.
In the alternative, the Court should solidify the meaningful
paradigm distinguishing between laws that discriminate based on
religious status and laws that discriminate based on religious use that it
used in Locke and Trinity Lutheran, and uphold Montana’s decision to
abide by its own constitution’s mandate against funding religious
education.

133. Id. at 17–18.
134. Id.
135. But see Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm Before the Storm for Religious-Liberty
Cases?, SCOTUSblog (Jul. 26, 2019, 10:42 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/ symposiumthe-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/ (stating the Court should use Espinoza to
“clarify that state constitutional Blaine Amendments that exclude religious groups from equal
participation in government benefits are impermissible”).
136. See SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3 (stating even though Montana’s holding
is consistent with Trinity Lutheran, the Court will likely apply the nondiscrimination concept to
the religious education situation).
137. See generally Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023
(2017) (contrasting with Locke by stressing that the student was denied a scholarship because of
what he proposed “to do,” not because of “who he was”).

